Nuclear Neighbours

Nuclear Neighbours

Pakistan and India may be neighbours geographically, but in the nuclear world they are anything but neighbourly. Historical enmity and mistrust play a major part in their decisions not to join the NPT – neither party will sign up to it unless the other also agrees to do so, adding to the international community’s growing concern over the monitoring of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

The deteriorating situation in Pakistan has become one of the major worries for the international community over the past years. The presence of Taliban insurgents and al Qaeda combatants, escalating unrest along the border with Afghanistan, swelling domestic terrorism and entrenched border disputes with India are three of the main problems facing the government of Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani. However, one other issue has increasingly become one of the top concerns for the international community: Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Or, more specifically, the difficulty in monitoring the arsenal and the military’s lack of control over it. In the eyes of many experts on nuclear counterproliferation the risks of nuclear technology finding its way to non-state actors is greater in Pakistan than anywhere else.

Pakistan, along with India, is the only openly recognized nuclear weapons power that has not joined the NPT. Since their nuclear weapons tests of 1998, both countries have been urged to join the non-proliferation regime on several occasions. Nevertheless, the prospects of any of the two agreeing to do so are very small. Islamabad will not sign the NPT unless Delhi does, and vice versa.

Historical enmity and recent developments have moved the possibility of Pakistan and India joining the NPT further away. Islamabad has lived with the fear of losing northwest Kashmir to India since the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947. Pakistan and India have fought two more wars, and smaller skirmishes have occurred several times. But violence between both countries has diminished dramatically since the 1998 nuclear tests. For Islamabad, this is proof of the deterrent effect of its nuclear arsenal.

This deterrent effect was further demonstrated in November of last year, when ten gunmen killed at least 173 people and wounded over 300 in Mumbai. Indian police forces identified the attackers as Pakistani nationals and there were suggestions that the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence services, were linked to the attacks. Tensions between both governments escalated until Pakistan recognized in February of this year that the attacks had been at least partly planned on its soil. The Pakistani police also detained several people accused of being connected to the attack. In May, Dr Samar Mubarakmand, a well-known Pakistani nuclear scientist, said that his country’s nuclear capability had saved it from being attacked by India following the terrorist act in Mumbai. This shows the mistrust of many Pakistanis towards their Southern neighbour.

This mistrust also grew in October 2008, when US Congress gave final approval to a civilian nuclear deal with India. The agreement was first introduced by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July 2005, and lifts an American moratorium on nuclear technology assistance and exports to India dating back more than three decades. In return for this assistance Indian civilian nuclear facilities will be monitored by IAEA inspectors. However, military nuclear facilities are not covered by the agreement, even though India is now eligible to buy dual-use nuclear technology and equipment to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium, all of which can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.

Critics of the deal argue that it discriminates against Pakistan, who might decide to turn to China to obtain a similar agreement. Since both Islamabad and Beijing believe that the agreement between Delhi and Washington is pointed towards them, it seems clear that the deal will only serve to strengthen their nuclear ties and reduce Pakistan’s appetite for joining the NPT. Indeed, when President Asif Ali Zardari visited China shortly after US Congress approved the agreement Beijing announced that it would assist Pakistan in the construction of two nuclear reactors.

Pakistan’s mistrust of India is reciprocated by the latter. Historical problems, most notably the troubles over Kashmir mentioned before, underpin Indian concerns. However, a more recent development significantly raised Delhi’s concerns over Islamabad’s nuclear programme. This was the discovery of A.Q. Khan’s clandestine nuclear proliferation network.

In January 2004, Khan confessed to having been involved in the supply of nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Even though he later retracted his confession, Iran and Libya have confirmed that they received nuclear components from Khan’s network. Earlier this year, when a Pakistani court freed Khan from house arrest for his involvement in the network, Indian Secretary of External Affairs Anand Sharma accused Pakistan of deceiving his country. This shows India’s sensitivity towards the proliferation activities of Khan’s network and the lingering tensions that result from it. Coupled with the worrisome political and security situation in Pakistan, India has a real fear that Islamabad might be incapable of controlling its nuclear arsenal.

Even in the event of a significant improvement of relations between Pakistan and India regional issues make it unlikely that they would join the NPT. India has long-standing border problems with nuclear-armed China. Pakistan limits to its West with Iran, whose government seems determined to obtain a nuclear programme and, according to some Western countries, nuclear weapons. Pakistani and Indian nuclear capabilities allow both countries to balance their powerful neighbours but complicate strategic equations, making possession or acquisition of nuclear weapons desirable for all powers in the region.

Indo-Pakistani enmity means that it is unlikely that any of them will join the NPT any time soon. Therefore, efforts to minimize the risk of proliferation in South India should therefore concentrate on stabilizing Pakistan and improving military control over its nuclear arsenal.

Ramon Pacheco Pardo – Researcher in counter-proliferation and East Asian politics